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Economic Globalisation, Democracy and Income in Sub-
Saharan Africa: A Panel Cointegration Analysis 
 
Daniel Sakyi1 






Sub-Saharan  Africa  has  been  characterised  by  low-income  levels  for  decades. 
This  paper  analyses  the  impact  of  economic  globalisation  and  democracy  on 
income in sub-Saharan Africa using panel cointegration techniques. The paper 
considers  a  composite  indicator  for  economic  globalisation  and  several 
alternative  indicators  of  democracy  and  highlights  the  essence  of  the 
simultaneous  adoption  of  economic  globalisation  and  democracy  for  sub-
Saharan  African  countries.  The  empirical  results  based  on  a  sample  of  31 
countries over the 1980-2005 period, clearly indicate that, whilst the total long 
run impact of economic globalisation on income has been beneficial, the total 
long run impact of democracy has been the bane of income in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The  paper  concludes  that  policy  reforms  should  aim  to  improve  democratic 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa for its potential benefits to be realised. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  past  few  decades  have  seen  a  resurgence  of  research  on  the  impact  of 
economic globalisation and democracy on economic performance of developing 
countries.  Does  economic  globalisation  and  democracy  go  hand  in  hand  to 
impact positive on economic performance of developing countries in the long 
run? For sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), most governments prior to the 1980s were 
very  skeptical  on  the  success  of  opening  their  economies  to  international 
competition. However, this perception changed in the early 1980s and the result 
has been the adoption of trade and financial liberalisation policies for many of 
these countries (Rudra, 2005). Democracy, on the other hand, was virtually not 
in  existence  in  SSA  prior  to  the  1990s  as  many  impediments2  existed  that 
undermined  democratisation  (Ndulu  and  O’Connell,  1999;  Brown,  2005). 
Nonetheless,  as  Fosu  (2008)  note,  democracy  became  important  in  SSA 
beginning in the early 1990s as it was expected would help improve the dismal 
economic performance that had existed for decades. 
 
The arguments in favour of economic globalisation as a determinant of economic 
performance are well documented in the literature. For example, Dreher (2006) 
and Villaverde and Maza (2011) argue that economic globalisation is conducive 
for economic performance, although this effect is small in magnitude. For many 
developing countries, economic globalisation (in particular trade liberalisation) 
became  important,  due  to  the  perceived  ineffectiveness  of  foreign  aid  as  an 
“engine”  of  development.  Trade  liberalisation  makes  possible  to  import 
intermediate inputs to augment domestic savings, as well as the exploitation of 
economics  of  scale  and  technological/knowledge  spillovers  (McKinnon,  1964; 
Grossman  and  Helpman,  1991;  Marin,  1992;  Prasad  et  al.,  2003).  Financial 
liberalisation on the other hand has the potential to stimulate the development 
of  the  domestic  financial  sector  for  long-term  growth  (Levine,  1996;  Henry, 
2000). Therefore, economic globalisation would in general play a critical role as 
a catalyst for economic prosperity in the developing world. 
                                                        
2  As  Brown  (2005)  note,  such  impediments  mainly  constituted  lack  of  formal  institutional 
structures (including rule of law) conducive for sustaining the immediate survival of democracy   3 
 
Many empirical studies on the relationship between economic globalisation and 
economic  performance  have  focused  on  specific  dimensions  of  economic 
globalisation  (mainly  trade  and  financial  liberalisation).  The  most  interesting 
discussion  on  the  link  between  economic  globalisation  and  economic 
performance  is  the contrast between  empirical  papers  on  trade  and financial 
liberalisation. For example, trade liberalisation has often reported statistically 
significant positive relationship with income and/or growth (see Balassa, 1978, 
1985;  Ram,  1985,  1987;  Sachs  and  Warner,  1995;  Harrison,  1996,  Thornton, 
1996; Dalley and Kraay, 2001; Ibrahim and MacPhee, 2003; Yanikkaya, 2003; 
Abual-Foul,  2004).  However,  the  result  of  a  positive  impact  of  financial 
liberalisation especially for developing countries has been limited, although the 
financial integration of developing countries to the global economy has increased 
in recent decades (Prasad et al., 2003)3. For example, Edwards (2001) notes that 
financial liberalisation is conducive for economic performance in high-income 
countries  but  not  in  low-income  countries.  Moreover,  not  all  developing 
countries have benefited adequately from capital flows as the inflows of capital 
have only been confined to a few developing countries, with the majority left 
behind (Mishkin, 2007). One reason being that many developing countries are 
characterised by low institutional quality (Alfaro et al., 2005). For these reasons, 
the predictions of theoretical models on the benefits of financial liberalisation for 
developing countries are not evident so far.  
 
The  accession  of  SSA  countries  to  the  global  economy4  has  been  achieved 
through trade and financial liberalisation programmes initiated by the IMF, the 
World  Bank  and  the  WTO.  However,  the  choice  of  trade  and/or  financial 
liberalisation  policies  involves  a  political  component.  According  to  Gordon 
                                                        
3 Prasad et al. (2003) further note that for developing countries financial liberalisation is neither 
a necessary nor sufficient condition for economic performance, as over the period 1970-2000 for 
example, Botswana relatively closed to capital flows achieved strong growth rates whilst Peru 
relatively open to capital flows suffered a decline in growth rates. 
4  SSA  countries  have  been  involved  in  numerous  bilateral  and  multilateral  development 
partnership agreements with the external world for decades. Recent agreements have included 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), the Economic Partnership Agreements 
(EPA), Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPIC) Initiative and Aid for Trade (AFT), all aimed at 
improving economic performance of the sub-region   4 
(1996), “the single most important characteristic of recent political change in 
sub-Saharan  Africa  is  the  diminished  ability  of  the  states  to  monopolize  the 
political,  economic,  and  institutional  environments  as  they  had  since 
independence”. Moreover, although the benefits of economic globalisation can 
fully  be  realised  when  combined  with  improvements  in  governance  and 
democratic institutions (Gordon, 1996), trade and financial liberalisation have 
both  economic  and  political  consequences.  For  many  developing  countries 
“globalization has provided the best opportunities for political democracies and 
good governance” (Marquardt, 2007). As Sorensen (2010) note, an important 
element  associated  with  democratisation  is  the  support  of  a  market-based 
economy. Thus, while economic globalisation may pave the way for democracy, 
this may also have the potential to develop market-oriented policies5 that may or 
may  not  be  conducive  for  a  better  economic  performance.  Moreover,  the 
simultaneous  adoption  or  the  interaction  of  both  economic  globalisation  and 
democratisation, though may also have short-run conflicting impact on economic 
performance, has the potential for a long run complementary role on economic 
performance (Van De Walle, 1994; Gordon, 1996). For this reason, if the concept 
of “policy trilemma”, as discussed in Rodrik (2002), is what actually explains the 
relationships between economic globalisation, the nation state and democratic 
politics,  then  with  the  current  speed  (and  it  seems  irreversible  nature)  of 
economic  globalisation,  democratic  politics  seem  to  be  the  choice  alongside 
economic globalisation with the role of the nation state left at the background 
(Bairoch, 2000; Nasstrom, 2003). This result is particularly important for SSA 
countries, as economic globalisation would not impact on income in isolation 
from democratic institutions6.  
 
Democracy is crucial to economic success (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005) and it 
can  affect  economic  performance  through  a  number  of  channels.  Democratic 
institutions have the potential to redistribute income from the rich to the poor, 
                                                        
5 For a discussion on the relationship between economic globalisation and democracy readers 
are referred to (Giavazzi and Tabellini, 2005; Eichengreen and Leblang, 2008) 
6 A special case in contrast to this point is China that has chosen economic globalisation (without 
democracy) and has performed so well in terms of economic performance in recent decades. 
However, we do not know if China had performed much better than its present state if it was also 
a democracy.   5 
reduce  corruption  and  support  policies  encouraging  international  trade  and 
investment (Acemoglu, 2009; Aghion and Howitt, 2009). Moreover, in addition to 
sound macroeconomic policies, democracy can have an important impact on a 
country’s ability to attract less volatile capital inflows (Prasad et al., 2003). It is 
not surprising that different authors (Barro, 1996; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Minier, 
1998; Rodrik, 2002; Roll and Talbott, 2003; Rigobon and Rodrik, 2005) provide 
empirical evidence in support of a positive relationship between democracy and 
economic performance. For instance, Roll and Talbott (2003), in a cross-country 
investigation for between 134 and 157 countries over the period 1995-1999, 
find  highly  significant  positive  impact  of  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  on 
Gross  National  Income  per  capita.  They  further  stress  that  democratic 
institutions “allow citizens to provide feedback to government leaders about the 
effectiveness  of  policies  and  their  impact  on  general  welfare”.  Rigobon  and 
Rodrik  (2005)  used  identification  through  heteroskedasticity  to  study  the 
interrelationship  between  rule  of  law,  democracy,  openness,  and  income  and 
concluded that democracy is good for economic performance.  
 
Nonetheless, many countries in SSA are not only characterised by low-income 
(based  on  World  Bank  classification,  2011)7,  but  they  still  remain 
nondemocracies  (Acemoglu  et  al.,  2008).  Moreover,  although  many  empirical 
studies  test  specific  dimensions  of  economic  globalisation  and  income,  a 
comprehensive study on SSA that considers a composite indicator for economic 
globalisation as well as the interaction of economic globalisation and democracy 
is rare. The results of many of the existing studies are also plagued by estimation 
problems.  For  example,  the  problem  of  unit  root,  cross-country  dependence, 
cross-country heterogeneity and potential endogeneity of regressors are often 
not addressed. We overcome some of these problems in this paper. We use a 
composite  indicator  for  economic  globalisation  and  alternative  indicators  of 
democracy8  to  analyse  the  relationship  between  economic  globalisation, 
                                                        
7 Out of 40 low-income economies, 29 are from SSA. In addition, 11 economies from SSA fall in 
the  lower-middle-income  group.  Details  on  World  Bank  classification  of  economies  2011  is 
available at URL http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-
groups 
8 Details on these indicators are discussed under the data in Section 2    6 
democracy  and  income  for  SSA  countries.  We  adopt  panel  cointegration 
techniques that allow us to deal with problems of non-stationarity, cross-country 
dependence,  cross-country  heterogeneity  and  potential  endogeneity  of 
regressors.  Moreover,  we  address  the  issue  of  whether  the  link  between 
economic  globalisation,  democracy  and  income  can  be  considered  a  long  run 
relationship for SSA countries. The main results of the paper, clearly indicate 
that, whilst the total long run impact of economic globalisation on income has 
been beneficial, the total long run impact of democracy has been the bane of 
income in sub-Saharan Africa. The paper concludes that policy reforms should 
aim to improve democratic institutions in sub-Saharan Africa for its potential 
benefits to be realised. 
 
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organised  as  follows.  In  section  2  we  specify  the 
empirical model to be estimated and a description of the data. In addition, we 
consider issues of cross-sectional dependence in panel data models and provide 
some preliminary results using OLS methodology. Section 3 describes the panel 
cointegration  techniques.  Section  4  presents  and  discusses  the  panel 
cointegration  results.  Section  5  concludes  the  paper  with  some  policy 
implications of the empirical findings. 
 
 
2. Empirical Model 
 
2.1 Model specification 
 
To estimate the impact of economic globalisation and democracy on income, we 
consider the following model specification: 
 
yit =ai + x'it bi +eit,  1,2,......, , i N =   1,2,......, t T =                                                      (1) 
 
where  yit   is  the  dependent  variable,  i  is  the  cross-section  dimension  for 
individual  countries,  t   is  the  time  series  dimension  of  the  data,  ai  denotes   7 
country-specific  intercept,  1 2 ( , ,......., ) i i i Mi b b b b = ,  1 , 2 , , ( , ,......., ) it i t i t Mi t x x x x = , 
1,2,....., m M =  where  m  is the number of regressors and  it e  is the error term9. 
To  define  m  we  consider  economic  globalisation,  democracy  and  their 
interaction  term.  Therefore,  based  on  equation  (1)  the  following  specific 
equation is estimated: 
 
1 2 3 log ( * ) it i it it it it Y EG DM EG DM a b b b e = + + + +                                                        (2) 
 
where  it Y  is real GDP per capita (i.e. income),  EGit is economic globalisation, 
DMit  denotes  measures  of  democracy,  EGit *DMit  is  the  interaction  term 
between economic globalisation and democracy, log is the logarithm operator, 




2.2 The Data  
 
The panel data consists of annual observations for 31 SSA countries (i.e. N=31) 
for the period 1980-2005 (i.e. T=26). The countries included in our panel dataset 
are:  Benin;  Botswana;  Burkina  Faso;  Burundi;  Cameroon;  Central  African 
Republic; Chad; Congo, Republic of; Cote d'Ivoire; Gabon; Ghana; Guinea; Guinea-
Bissau; Kenya; Lesotho; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Nigeria; 
Rwanda;  Senegal;  Sierra  Leone;  South  Africa;  Swaziland;  Tanzania;  Togo; 
Uganda; Zambia; Zimbabwe10.  
 
The data have been drawn from various sources. Data for real GDP per capita is 
taken  from  African  Development  Indicators  (2010).  Data  for  economic 
                                                        
9  Where  appropriate  the  intercept/country-specific  fixed-effects  (ai)  is  extended  to  include 
deterministic  time  trends.  In  addition,  the  intercept, deterministic  time  trends  and  the  slope 
coefficients  (bi )  are  allowed  to  vary  across  individual  countries.  The  inclusion  of  country-
specific fixed-effects and deterministic time trends allow us to capture any omitted variables 
assumed to be stable in the long run relationship. 
10 The selection of countries have been influenced by data availability for all variables considered   8 
globalisation is taken from KOF Index of Globalisation 201011. KOF’s economic 
globalisation index combines data on trade, foreign direct investment (flows), 
foreign  direct  investment  (stock),  portfolio  investment,  income  payments  to 
foreign nationals, hidden import barriers, mean tariff rate, taxes on international 
trade and capital account restrictions.  
 
The democracy variable is proxied by three indicators12. The first indicator of 
democracy  is  Polity2  obtained  from  Polity  IV  Project  (Marshall  and  Jaggers, 
2009). Polity2 is a continuous variable that measures the democratic quality of 
political regimes using polity scores; it ranges from -10 (strongly autocratic) to 
+10  (strongly  democratic).  Polity  scores  (i.e.  autocracy  score  (-10  to  0)  and 
democracy score (+10 to 0) - from which Polity2 is derived - are themselves 
derived  from  a  combination  of  measures:  competitiveness  of  executive 
recruitment,  constraint  of  chief  executive,  openness  of  executive  recruitment, 
regulation and competitiveness of participation. The second and third indicators 
of democracy are political rights and political rights + civil liberties respectively. 
Data  for  political  rights  and  civil  liberties  are  obtained  from  the  Heritage 
Foundation’s subjective “Index of Economic Freedom” (Freedom House, 2006). 
These  two  measures  are  based  on  annual  ranking  of  countries  from  1  (the 
highest rank) to 7 (the lowest rank) for each measure13. We normalise the three 
indicators of democracy to range from 0 (full autocracy) to 1 (full democracy). 
We  denote  the  three  normalised  democracy  indicators  as  PS  (Polity2),  PR 
(political rights) and PC (political rights + civil liberties). It is important to note 
that, although the three democracy indicators may be highly correlated, they are 
measuring different dimensions of the political system and we should expect that 
they have independent implications on income.  Additional information on the 
data are presented in Appendix A1. 
 
 
                                                        
11 Details on KOF’s Index is available at URL http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/  
12 We define democracy in this paper as the extent to which the political system is democratic or 
nondemocratic 
13 We combine the two measures (i.e. political rights + civil liberties) for our third indicator of 
democracy such that the annual ranking of countries ranges from 2 (the highest rank) to 14 (the 
lowest rank)   9 
2.3 Cross-sectional dependence in panel data models 
 
Economic  globalisation  implies  strong  and  increasing  interdependencies 
between countries so it is no wonder that the importance to consider the impact 
of cross-sectional dependence in cross-country panels has been emphasised in 
the literature (see Frees, 1995; Driscoll and Kraay, 1998; Pesaran, 2004, 2007; 
De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006; Baltagi, 2008). As De Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) 
note, cross-sectional dependence may be present in cross-country panels due to 
unobserved common shocks that become part of the error term. For this reason, 
cross-sectional  dependence  if  present  and  not  accounted  for  may  result  in 
inconsistent  standard  errors  of  the  parameters,  although  the  estimated 
parameters may be consistent (Driscoll and Kraay, 1998). This effect becomes 
even more important in cross-country panels where N>T.  
 
To  determine  the  presence  of  cross-sectional  dependence  the  two 
semiparametric test proposed by Friedman (1937) and Frees (1995), and the 
parametric  test  proposed  by  Pesaran  (2004)  appropriate  for  N>T  panels  are 
employed in this paper. The procedures involved in computing the test statistics 
as  well  as  the  test  results  are  provided  in  Appendix  A2.  Where  appropriate, 
Tables in this paper report in columns I, II and III the model with PS, PR and PC 
respectively. The results suggest that there is enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of error cross-sectional independence in all estimated models. In the 
presence  of  cross-sectional  dependence  Driscoll  and  Kraay  (1998)  propose  a 
nonparametric  correction  for  the  standard  errors  in  standard  panel  data 
estimators such as pooled OLS. We provide preliminary results (Table 2.1) using 
the pooled OLS estimator with Driscoll and Kraay corrected standard errors.  
 
The coefficient on EG is positive and statistically significant at the 1% error level 
for  all  estimated  models.  The  coefficient  on  all  indicators  of  democracy  is 
negative, but statistically significant only when we consider PS as an indicator of 
democracy. However, the result is different when we consider the impact of the 
interaction  terms.  All  interaction  terms  enters  positive  and  statistically 
significant for all estimated models. It is important to note that the impact of   10
economic  globalisation  (democracy)  on  income  is  not  only  captured  by  the 
coefficient  on  economic  globalisation  (democracy)  but  depends  also  on  their 
respective interaction terms. For this reason, the results clearly show that, the 
total effect of economic globalisation on income is positive for the alternative 
indicators  of  democracy  whilst  that  of  democracy  is  negative  (although  this 
negative effect is not captured when we consider PR  and PC as indicators of 
democracy as they are not statistically significant). Nonetheless, an important 
limitation  of  the  Driscoll  and  Kraay  pooled  OLS  estimator  is  that  potential 
endogeneity problems are not catered for. Moreover, pooled OLS estimates are 
based on stationarity assumption (i.e. for panels where T is of moderate size). 
For  these  reasons,  we  resort  to  panel  cointegration  techniques  to  check  the 
robustness of the results.  
 
Table 2.1 Pooled OLS estimates  
 
Variables  I  II  III 
EG  0.021***(0.002)  0.026***(0.003)  0.024***(0.004) 
PS  -1.496***(0.277)     
PR    -0.611(0.507)   
PC      -0.6762(0.554) 
EG*PS  0.032***(0.004)     
EG*PR    0.019*(0.010)   
EG*PC      0.023*(0.011) 
Note: Dependent variable logY. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are reported 
in parenthesis. ***(*) denote statistical significance at the 1% (10%) error level. 
 
3. Panel cointegration approach 
 
3.1 Unit root and cross-sectional dependence in panels 
 
Testing  for  panel  unit  roots  has  become  conventional  in  panel  cointegration 
studies. The argument in favour of panel unit root tests (as against performing 
individual  unit  root  test  for  each  cross-section  of  the  panel)  is  the  increased   11
power associated with the test especially for N>T panels14. Due to the problem of 
cross-sectional dependence in our panel dataset we only rely on unit root tests 
that allow us to treat this effect. Two alternative unit root tests, the LLC statistic 
due to Levin  et al.  (2002)  and the  CADF  statistic due to Pesaran (2007),  are 
considered15.  
 
The LLC test evaluates the null hypothesis that each individual unit in the panel 
contains a unit root against the alternative hypothesis that all individual unit of 
the panel is stationary. The test is appropriate for panels of moderate size (i.e. 
N=10-250 and T=25-250) and is generalised to allow for “fixed effects, individual 
deterministic  trends  and  heterogeneous  serially  correlated  errors”  (Baltagi, 
2008).  Both  N  and  T  are  allowed  to  approach  infinity  asymptotically.  In  the 
presence of cross-sectional dependence, Levin et al. (2002) suggest allowing for 
a  limited  degree  of  cross-sectional  dependence  by  subtracting  cross-sectional 
averages  from  the  data.  In  order  to  mitigate  the  impact  of  cross-sectional 
dependence we demean the data when implementing the LLC test.  
 
Pesaran (2007) provides cross-sectionally augmented Dickey-Fuller (CADF) test 
statistic  in  heterogeneous  panels  with  cross-sectional  dependence.  The  tests 
augment the standard  ADF regressions with the cross-sectional averages and 
their first differences to eliminate the impact of cross-sectional dependence. The 
null hypothesis assumes that all series are non-stationary versus the alternative 
hypothesis  that  only  a  fraction  of  the  series  is  stationary.  The  asymptotic 
distribution of CADF is non-standard and asymptotic critical values are provided 
for different values of both N and T.  
 
The  panel  unit  root  test  results  reported  in  Appendix  3A  suggest  that  all 
variables  can  be  treated  as  I(1)  stationary  or  integrated  of  order  one.  This 
indicates that the Driscoll and Kraay pooled OLS results may not be adequate 
                                                        
14 See Levin et al. (2002) 
15 Additional information on LLC and CADF panel unit root test are provided in the Appendix A3. 
Readers are also referred to (Levin and Lin, 1992; Levin et al., 2002; Pesaran, 2007) for further 
technical details   12
since OLS estimates are based on stationarity assumption. For this reason, the 
use of panel cointegration techniques becomes particularly important. 
 
3.2 Panel cointegration test 
 
In  this  paper  we  employ  Pedroni  (1999,  2004)  panel  cointegration  test  to 
determine  whether  the  variables  included  in  our  panel  data  models  are 
cointegrated16.  Pedroni  (1999,  2004)  proposes  seven  panel  cointegration test 
statistics that correct for bias introduced by potentially endogeneous regressors. 
The test allows “not only the dynamics and fixed effects to differ across members 
of the panel, but also that they allow the cointegrating vector to differ across 
members under  the  alternative” (Pedroni,  1999). For  this  reason,  all  the  test 
statistics are robust in the presence of panel data heterogeneity. Moreover, in the 
presence  of  cross-sectional  dependence  (most  importantly  in  small  samples), 
Pedroni suggest including common time dummies to mitigate this effect. This is 
important  as  Pedroni’s  test  is  only  valid  on  the  assumption  that  any  cross-
sectional correlations are captured by an aggregate time effect. 
 
Four  of  Pedroni’s  tests  are  based  on  within-dimension  of  the  panel  (panel 
cointegration test statistics): panel v-statistic, panel r-statistic, panel t-statistic 
(non-parametric) and panel t-statistic (parametric). The other three (that allows 
for potential heterogeneity across individual members of the panel) are based on 
between-dimension of the panel (group mean panel cointegration test statistics): 
group  r-statistic,  group  t-statistic  (non-parametric)  and  group  t-statistic 
(parametric).  
 
These tests  are  particularly appropriate  as  they are applied to  the  estimated 
regression  residuals  after  the  panel  statistics  have  been  normalised  with 
correction terms. The procedure involved in computing the seven test statistics 
as well as the test results are provided in Appendix 3A. The panel cointegration 
test results suggest that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
                                                        
16 Pedroni’s panel cointegration test is an extension of the Engle and Granger (1987) two-step 
procedure applied to panel data   13
no  cointegration  for  all  estimated  models.    In  other  words,  the  link  between 
economic  globalisation,  democracy  and  income  can  be  considered  a  long  run 
relationship. 
 
3.3 Estimation of panel cointegration regression 
 
Given that we find panel cointegration, we need to estimate the associated long 
run cointegration parameters. The OLS estimator is known to yield biased and 
inconsistent estimates. For this reason, several estimators have been proposed. 
For example, Kao and Chiang (2000) argue that their parametric panel Dynamic 
OLS (DOLS) estimator (that pools the data along the within-dimension of the 
panel)  is  promising  in  small  samples  and  performs  well  in  general  in 
cointegrated panels. However, the panel DOLS due to Kao and Chiang (2000) 
does  not  consider  the  importance  of  cross-sectional  heterogeneity  in  the 
alternative  hypothesis.  To  allow  for  cross-sectional  heterogeneity  in  the 
alternative  hypothesis,  endogeneity  and  serial  correlation  problems  to  obtain 
consistent and asymptotically unbiased estimates of the cointegrating vectors, 
Pedroni (2000; 2001) proposed the group mean Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) 
estimator for cointegrated panels.  
 
The group mean FMOLS estimator (which is based on the between-dimension of 
the  panel)  applies  a  semi-parametric  correction  to  the  OLS  estimator  and  it 
produces t-statistic that allows for more flexibility in the alternative hypothesis. 
Pedroni (2001) argues that pooling the data along the between-dimension of the 
panel have a more useful interpretation as the mean value of the cointegrating 
vectors in heterogeneous panels. Moreover, the group mean FMOLS estimator 
generates consistent estimates in small samples and does not suffer from large 
size distortions, in the presence of endogeneity and heterogeneous dynamics (as 
it allows for heterogeneity in the fixed effects and in the short run dynamics). In 
the presence of cross-sectional dependence, Pedroni (2001) suggest estimating 
the model with common time dummies to mitigate this effect. We employ the 
group mean FMOLS estimator to estimate the long run cointegration parameters 
in  equation  (2).  The  procedure  involved  in  estimating  the  panel  group  mean   14
FMOLS is provided in Appendix A4. However, we complement the group mean 
FMOLS results with the within-dimension panel DOLS (WPDOLS) estimates due 
to Kao and Chiang (2000) as well as the between-dimension group mean panel 
DOLS  (BPDOLS)  estimates  due  to  Pedroni  (2001).  All  estimators  are 
asymptotically normally distributed17. 
 
Table 4.1 Panel FMOLS estimates  
 
Variables  I  II  III 
EG  0.003***(3.712)  0.002*(1.937)  -0.0004(-0.435) 
PS  -0.310***(-4.911)     
PR    -0.446***(-6.669)   
PC      -0.542***(-7.399) 
EG*PS  0.007***(3.918)     
EG*PR    0.015***(8.209)   
EG*PC      0.019***(9.392) 
Note: Dependent variable logY. In parenthesis are t-ratios. ***(*) denote rejection 
of the null hypothesis at the 1%(10%) error level. 
 
4. Panel cointegration results and discussion 
 
In  this  section,  we  report  and  discusses  the  estimated  long  run  results.  The 
estimated long run estimates from the FMOLS,  WPDOLS and the BPDOLS results 
are reported in Tables 4.1-4.3 respectively.  
 
The  coefficient  on  EG enters positive and statistically significant in the  panel 
WDOLS estimates for all indicators of democracy and positive and statistically 
significant in the panel FMOLS and BDOLS estimates when we consider PS and 
PR as indicators of democracy. However, EG enters negative in the panel FMOLS 
and BDOLS estimates when we consider PC as an indicator of democracy, but 
insignificant at any conventional error level. The results, clearly indicate that, the 
                                                        
17 For more technical details on the panel FMOLS and the panel DOLS estimators, readers are 
referred to (Pedroni, 2000, 2001) and (Kao and Chiang, 2000) respectively.   15
impact of economic globalisation on income in SSA countries is positive (though 
marginal  in  magnitude).  The  coefficients  on  all  democracy  indicators  are 
negative  and  statistically  significant  for  all  estimators.  The  estimated  panel 
results, clearly indicate that, the impact of democracy on income in SSA countries 
is negative. Nonetheless, the impact of the interaction of economic globalisation 
and democracy is positive and statistically significant for all estimators and for 
all  democracy  indicators.  This  interaction  effect  makes  the  total  impact  of 
economic  globalisation  positive  (although  still  marginal)  whilst  that  of 
democracy still remains negative.  
 
Table 4.2 Panel WDOLS estimates  
 
Variables  I  II  III 
EG  0.020***(7.84)  0.025***(9.86)  0.022***(7.88) 
PS  -1.839***(-12.40)     
PR    -0.894***(-5.91)   
PC      -0.923***(-4.88) 
EG*PS  0.041***(10.33)     
EG*PR    0.027***(6.60)   
EG*PC      0.030***(6.10) 
Note: Dependent variable logY. In parenthesis are t-ratios. *** denote rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 1% error level. 
 
As a further robustness check we consider a general production function that 
incorporate  economic  globalisation,  democracy  and  their  interaction  term  as 
additional explanatory variables to labour and capital (see Appendix A1). The 
estimated results based on panel FMOLS are presented in Appendix A4. In all 
cases, the results clearly indicates that the total impact of economic globalisation 
is  positive  and  statistically  significant  whilst  that  of  democracy  still  remains 
negative and statistically significant. Overall the result suggests that, whilst the 
total impact of economic globalisation on income has been beneficial, the total 
impact of democracy has not been beneficial for economic performance in SSA 
countries.    16
Table 4.3 Panel BDOLS estimates  
 
Variables  I  II  III 
EG  0.003***(5.744)  0.004***(6.282)  -0.001(-1.117) 
PS  -0.247***(-6.379)     
PR    -0.517***(-11.86)   
PC      -0.745***(-14.14) 
EG*PS  0.005***(5.568)     
EG*PR    0.018***(16.264)   
EG*PC      0.021***(15.295) 
Note: Dependent variable logY. In parenthesis are t-ratios. *** denote rejection of 
the null hypothesis at the 1% error level. 
 
The results of a negative impact of democracy on income is not surprising as the 
level (and quality) of  democracy in  SSA countries  is too low for its potential 
positive  impact  to  be  felt  on  income  and/or  growth.  In  particular,  the  mean 
values of our democracy indicators of 0.3818, 0.3201 and 0.3419 for PS, PR and 
PC respectively are too low for their potential benefits to be realised. Moreover, 
one could think of what has happened to the level of income in Cote d’Ivoire, for 
example, between December 2010 and March 2011. This phenomenon has also 
characterised many other SSA countries for decades. Our results which support 
the predictions  of theoretical  models on the  impact  of democracy  on income 
confirms further the results in Fosu (2008) that greater democratic advancement 
would  be  conducive  for  economic  performance  in  SSA  countries.  Overall  our 
result indicates that the simultaneous adoption of both economic globalisation 
and democracy is crucial for economic performance. Therefore, both economic 
globalisation and democracy do matter for the level of income in SSA. 
 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
 
This  paper  has  analysed  the  long  run  cointegration  relationship  between 
economic globalisation, democracy and income for 31 SSA countries using panel 
cointegration techniques, over the 1980-2005 period. We estimated a model that   17
considered  a  composite  indicator  for  economic  globalisation  and  several 
alternative  indicators  of  democracy.  Different  tests  for  unit  roots  and 
cointegration for panels were considered. The panel unit roots test results show 
that all series are stationary only after first differencing. The panel cointegration 
test  establishes  long  run  cointegration  relationship  between  economic 
globalisation, democracy and income. The long run coefficients were estimated 
using alternative estimators. The empirical results clearly indicate that, whilst 
the  total  long  run  impact  of  economic  globalisation  on  income  has  been 
beneficial, the total long run impact of democracy has been the bane of income in 
SSA.  
 
Our empirical results reveals important policy implications. The panel estimates 
suggest the essence of the simultaneous adoption of both economic globalisation 
and  democracy  for  SSA  countries.  This  implies  that  the  recent  adoption  of 
economic and political liberalisation policies in SSA countries are in the right 
direction  so  far  as  economic  performance  is  concerned.  However,  due  to  the 
negative impact of democracy on income, policy reforms should aim to improve 















   18
Reference: 
 
Abual-Foul, B. (2004). “Testing the export-led growth hypothesis: evidence from 
Jordan”, Applied Economics Letters, 11: 393-396 
 
Acemoglu,  D.  (2009).  Introduction  to  Modern  Economic  Growth,  Princeton 
University Press 
 
Acemogku,  D.,  Johnson,  S.,  Robinson,  J.,  and  P.  Yared  (2008),  “Income  and 
Democracy”, American Economic Review, 98: 808-842  
 
Aghion,  P.,  and  P.  Howitt  (2009),  The  Economics  of  Growth,  Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology (MIT) 
 
Alfaro,  L.,  Kalemli-Ozcan,  S.  and  V.  Volosovych  (2005),  “Capital  Flows  in  a 
Globalized World: The Role of Policies and Institutions”, NBER Working Paper, 
No. 11696, Cambridge 
 
Balassa, B. (1978). “Exports and Economic Growth: Further Evidence”, Journal of 
Development Economics, 5: 181-189 
 
Balassa, B. (1985). “Exports, Policy Choices, and Economic Growth in Developing 
Countries after the 1973 Oil Shock”, Journal of Development Economics, 18: 23-35 
 
Barro, R. J. (1996), “Democracy and Growth”, Journal of Economic Growth, 1: 1-27 
 
Brairoch,  P.  (2000).  “The  Constituent  Economic  Principles  of  Globalisation  in 
Historical Perspective: Myths and Realities”, translated by Michelle Kendall and 
Stuart Kendall, International Sociology, 15: 197-214 
 
Brown, S (2005), “Foreign Aid and Democracy Promotion: Lessons from Africa”, 
The European Journal of Development Research, 17: 179-198 
   19
De Hoyos, R. E. and Y. Sarafidis (2006) “Testing for cross-sectional dependence in 
panel-data models”, The Stata Journal, 6: 482-496 
 
Dollar, D. and A. Kraay (2001). “Trade, Growth, and Poverty”, The World Bank 
Policy Research Working Paper, No. 2615. Washington 
 
Dreher,  A.  (2006).  “Does  Globalisation  affect  Growth?”,  Evidence  from  a  New 
Index of Globalisation, Applied Economics, 38: 1091-1110 
 
Driscoll, J. C. And A. C. Kraay (1998), “Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation 
with Spatially Dependent Panel Data”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 80: 
549-560  
 
Eichengreen,  B.  and  D.  Leblang  (2008),  “Democracy  and  Globalisation”, 
Economics & Politics, 20: 289-334 
 
Edwards, S. (2001), “Capital Mobility and Economic Growth Performance: Are 
Emerging Economies Different?”, NBER Working Paper, No. 8076. Cambridge 
 
Frees,  E.  W.  (1995),  “Assessing  Cross-sectional  Correlation  in  Panel  Data”, 
Journal of Econometrics, 69: 393-414 
 
Friedman, M. (1937), “The Use of Ranks to Avoid the Assumption of Normality 
Implicit  in  the  Analysis  of  Variance”,  Journal  of  the  American  Statistical 
Association, 32: 675-701 
 
Fosu, A. K (2008), “Democracy and Growth in Africa: Implications of Increasing 
Electoral Competitiveness”, Economics Letters, 100: 442-444  
 
Freedom House (2006), Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972-2006 
   20
Gordon,  D.  F.  (1996),  “Sustaining  Economic  Reforms  Under  Political 
Liberalisation in Africa: Issues and Implications”, World Development, 24: 1527-
1537 
 
Grossman, G. M. and E. Helpman (1991). Innovation and Growth in the Global 
economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Harrison,  A.  (1996).  “Openness  and  Growth:  A  Time-Series,  Cross-Country 
Analysis for Developing Countries”, Journal of Development Economics, 48: 419-
447 
 
Henry, P. (2000). “Stock Market Liberalisation, Economic Reform, and Emerging 
Market Equity Prices”, Journal of Finance, 55: 529-564 
 
Ibrahim,  I.,  and  C.  R.  MacPhee  (2003).  “Export  Externalities  and  Economic 
Growth”, The Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, 12: 257-
283 
 
KOF Index of Globalisation (2010). http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/ 
 
Levine, R. (1996), Foreign Banks, Financial Development, and Economic Growth, 
in  International  Financial  Markets:  Harmonization  versus  Competition,  ed.  By 
Claude, E. Barfield, pp. 224-254, AIE Press  
 
Levin, A., and C.F.  Lin (1992), “Unit Root Test in Panel Data: Asymptotic and 
Finite-Sample Properties”, UC San Diego, Working Paper 92-23 
 
Levin, A., Lin, C. and C. J. Chu (2002), “Unit Root Test in Panel Data: Asymptotic 
and Finite Sample Properties”, Journal of Econometrics, 108: 1-24 
 
Marin, D. (1992). “Is the Export-Led Growth Hypothesis Valid for Industrialised 
Countries?”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 74: 678 – 688 
   21
Marquardt,  M.  J.  (2007),  “Globalisation:  Fight  It,  or  Embrace  and  Purify  It?”, 
Human Resource Development Quarterly, 18: 285-291 
 
Marshall,  M.  G.,  Jaggers,  K.  (2009),  Polity  IV  Project:  Political  Regime 
Characteristics  and  Transitions,  1800-2009,  Center  for  Systemic  Peace  and 
Colorado State University. http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm 
 
Minier, J. A. (1998), “Democracy and Growth: Alternative Approaches”, Journal of 
Economic Growth, 3: 241-266 
 
Mishkin, F. S. (2007), “In Financial Globalisation Beneficial?”, Journal of Money, 
Credit and Banking, 39:259-294 
 
Nasstrom,  S.  (2003),  “What  Globalisation  Overshadows”,  Political  Theory,  31: 
808-834 
 
Ndulu, B. J., and S. A. O’Connell (1999), “Governance and Growth in Sub-Saharan 
Africa”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 13: 41-66 
 
Pedroni,  P.  (1999).  “Critical  Values  for  Cointegration  Tests  in  Heterogeneous 
Panels  with  Multiple  Regressors”,  Oxford  Bulletin  of  Economics  and  Statistics, 
Special Issue, 61: 653-670 
 
Pedroni, P. (2000). “Fully-Modified OLS for Heterogeneous Cointegration Panel”, 
Advances in Econometrics. 15, 93-130 
 
Pedroni, P. (2001). “Purchasing Power Parity Tests in Cointegrated Panels”, The 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 83: 727-731 
 
Pedroni,  P.  (2004).  “Panel  Cointegration:  Asymptotic  and  Finite  Samples 
Properties  of  Pooled  Time  Series  Tests  with  an  Application  to  the  PPP 
Hypothesis” Econometric Theory, 20: 597-625 
   22
Pesaran, M. H. (2007), “A Simple Panel Unit Root Test in the Presence of Cross-
Sectional Dependence”, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 27: 265-312 
 
Phillips,  P.,  and  D.  Sul  (2003),  “Dynamic  Panel  Estimation  and  Homogeneity 
Testing Under Cross Section Dependence”, The Econometrics Journal, 6: 217-259 
 
Prasad,  E.,  S.,  Rogoff,  K.,  Wei,  S.,  and  M.  A.  Kose  (2003),  “Effects  of  Financial 
Globalisation  on  Developing  Countries:  Some  Empirical  Evidence”,  Occasional 
Paper 220, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Washington DC 
 
Ram,  R.  (1985).  “Exports  and  Economic  Growth:  Some  Additional  Evidence”, 
Economic Development and Cultural Change, 33: 415-25 
 
Ram,  R.  (1987).  “Exports  and  Economic  Growth  in  Developing  Countries: 
Evidence  from  Time-Series  and  Cross-Sectional  Data”,  Economic  Development 
and Cultural Change, 36: 51-72 
 
Rigobon,  R.  and  D.  Rodrik  (2005),  “Rule  of  Law,  Democracy,  Openness,  and 
Income: Estimating the Interrelationships”, Economics of Transition, 13: 533-564 
 
Rodrik,  D.  (2002).  “Feasible  Globalisation”,  NBER  Working  Papers,  No.  9129, 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 
 
Roll,  R.,  and  J.  R.  Talbott  (2003),  “Political  Freedom,  Economic  Liberty,  and 
Prosperity”. Journal of Democracy, 14: 75-89 
 
Rudra,  N.  (2005),  “Globalisation  and  Strengthening  of  Democracy  in  the 
Developing World”, American Journal of Political Science, 49: 704-730  
 
Sachs, J., and A. Warner (1995). "Economic Reform and the Process of Global 
Integration," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1-95 
   23
Sala-i-Martin, X. (1997). “I Just Ran Four Million Regressions”, NBER Working 
Paper No. 6252, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc 
 
Sarafidis,  V.,  and  D.  Robertson  (2006),  “On  the  Impact  of  Cross  section 
Dependence  is  Short  Dynamic  Panel  Estimation”,  mimeo,  University  of 
Cambridge 
 
Sarafidis, V., and T. Wansbeek (2010), “Cross-sectional Dependence in Panel Data 
Analysis”, MPRA paper No. 20367 
 
Sorensen, G. (2010), “Democracy and Democratisation”, Handbooks of Sociology 
and Social Research, Part II, 441-458 
 
Thornton, J. (1996). “Cointegration, Causality and Export-Led Growth in Mexico, 
1895 – 1992”, Economics Letters, 50: 413 – 416 
 
Villaverde, J., and A. Maza (2011). “Globalisation, Growth and Convergence”, The 
World Economy, 34: 952 - 971  
 
World  Bank  Classification  (2011),  http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifications/country-and-lending-groups 
 
Yanikkaya, H. (2003). “Trade Openness and Economic Growth: A Cross-Country 









   24
Appendix A1 
 
Augmented Production Function Model 
 
To further check the robustness of the empirical results we estimate the impact 
of  economic  globalisation  and  democracy  on  income  using  alternative  model 
specification. For this reason, we define  m (see equation (1) by considering a 
general production function that incorporate economic globalisation, democracy 
and  their  interaction  term  as  additional  explanatory  variables  to  labour  and 








it Y   is  real  GDP,  Lit   is  labour,  Kit   is  the  capital  stock,  EGit ,DMit ,  
EGit *DMit , log, ai  and eit  are as previously defined and β1 to β5 are parameters 
to be estimated with β3 to β5 the parameters of interest.  
 
Data definition and sources 
 
Y: Real GDP per capita; African Development Indicators (2010), The World Bank 
Y*: Real GDP; African Development Indicators (2010), The World Bank 
L: Labour Force; African Development Indicators (2010), The World Bank 
K: Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP); United Nations Statistical Division 
PS: Polity2; Marshall and Jaggers (2009) 
PR/PC: Heritage Foundation; Freedom House (2006) 
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Table 1.1A Components of KOF’s Economic Globalisation Index 
 
Indices and Variables  Weights 
i) Actual Flows  50% 
Trade (% of GDP)  19% 
Foreign Direct Investment, Flows (% of 
GDP) 
22% 
Foreign Direct Investment, Stock (% of 
GDP) 
24% 
Portfolio Investment (% of GDP)  17% 
Income Payments to Foreign Nationals 
(% of GDP) 
20% 
ii) Restrictions  50% 
Hidden Import Barriers  22% 
Mean Tariff Rate   28% 
Taxes  on  International  Trade  (%  of 
current revenue) 
27% 





Cross-sectional dependence in panel data models 
 
To compute the three statistics we estimate equation (2) and then compute the 
following:  
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where  r
Ù
  is  the  estimate  of  Spearman’s  rank  correlation  coefficient 
rij = rji =
rit - T + 1
2 ( ) ( )
t=1
T
∑ rjt - T + 1
2 ( ) ( )
rit - T + 1





  of the residuals. 
 
































. The null hypothesis 
tests  rij = rji = corr(eit,e jt) = 0 for  i ¹ j versus the  alternative hypothesis that 
rit = rji ¹ 0 for some i ¹ j. The test results are reported in Tables 2.1A – 2.2A18.  
 
Table 2.1A Tests for cross sectional independence (equation 2) 
 
Test statistics  I  II  III 
Frees  9.281***  9.230***  9.607*** 
Friedman  35.908  46.683**  46.683** 
Pesaran  1.790*  3.751***  3.716*** 
ABS  0.512  0.521  0.540 
Note:  ABS  is  the  average  absolute  value  of  the  off-diagonal  elements  of  the 
residuals.  Critical  values  from  Frees’  Q  distribution  are  0.1870,  0.1297  and 
0.0996  for  the  1%,  5%  and  10%  error  level  respectively.  ***(**)(*)  denote 




                                                        
18 The three test statistics have been computed using the “XTCSD” routine in STATA   27
Table 2.2A Tests for cross sectional independence (equation 2A) 
 
Test statistics  I  II  III 
Frees  8.170***  8.807***  8.861*** 
Friedman  38.056  48.982**  45.988** 
Pesaran  2.214**.  3.592**  3.694*** 
ABS  0.467  0.496  0.497 
Note:  ABS  is  the  average  absolute  value  of  the  off-diagonal  elements  of  the 
residuals.  Critical  values  from  Frees’  Q  distribution  are  0.1870,  0.1297  and 
0.0996 for the 1%, 5% and 10% error level respectively. ***(**) denote statistical 
significance at the 1%(5%) error level. 
 
The results suggest that there is enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of 
error cross-sectional independence for the case of Frees’ R2 and Pesaran’s CD 
tests for all estimated models. There is also enough evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis of error cross-sectional independence for the case of Friedman’s R for 
models  II  and  III.  Nonetheless,  not  enough  evidence  exists  to  reject  the  null 
hypothesis  of  cross-sectional  independence  for  the  case  of  Friedman’s  R  for 
model I. It is important to note that both Friedman’s R and Pesaran’s CD tests are 
known to lack power when the error structure alternate in sign19. This is the case 
as both tests compute the sum of the pair-wise coefficients of the residual matrix 
that may cancel out when averaging. However, since Frees’ R2 compute the sum 
of the squared rank correlation coefficients it is not subject to this drawback. For 
this  reason,  De Hoyos  and  Sarafidis  (2006) argue that if there is not enough 
evidence  to  reject  the  null  hypothesis  of  cross-sectional  independence  for 
Friedman’s R and/or Pesaran’s CD (but not the case for Frees’ R2) and there is 
also  enough  evidence  to  believe  that  the  correlation  coefficient  of  the  errors 
alternate  in  sign  (for  which  the  average  absolute  value  of  the  off-diagonal 
elements of the correlated residuals is large)20 then inference should be based on 
Frees’ R2. This result is exactly the case in model I and it suggests that there is 
enough evidence to reject the null hypothesis of cross-sectional independence.  
                                                        
19 See De Hoyos and Sarafidis, 2006 
20 Not reported, the correlation coefficients of the errors are available upon request   28
Appendix A3 
 
Panel unit root and cointegration tests 
 
The LLC test is based on the following regression 
Dyit = dyi,t-1 + qiLDyi,t-L +amidmt
L=1
pi
∑ + eit                                                                        (6) 
where m=1, 2, 3, and  dmt and ami are used to indicate the vector of deterministic 
variables  and  the  corresponding  vector  of  coefficients  for  a  particular  model 
m=1, 2, 3 respectively. LLC suggest three-step procedure that implements the 
test, since the lag order  pi (which is allowed to vary across individuals in the 
panel)  is  unknown.  The  three-steps  involves  the  estimation  of  a  separate 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) regression for each N, the estimation of the long 
run  to  short-run  standard  deviations  and  the  estimation  of  the  panel  test 
statistics. 
 
Pesaran considers the following CADF regression 
 




t+ eit                                                                        (7) 
where  y
_
t is the average at time t for the cross-sectional dimension of the panel. 
The  presence  of  cross-sectional  averages  of  lagged  levels  ( y
_
t-1)  and  first 
differences (D y
_
t) of the individual series capture the cross-sectional dependence 
through a factor structure21. In the presence of serial correlation in the error 
term, Pesaran suggest augmenting (7) with appropriate lags. Pesaran obtain the 
CADF (CIPS   Zt-bar ) statistic by averaging the t-statistic on the lagged value for 
each unit i (CADF i). 
 
 
                                                        







∑                                                                                                    (8) 
The panel unit roots test results are presented in Tables 3.1A – 3.2A22. 
 
Table 3.1A Panel unit root test results 
 
Variables  Levels  First Differences 
LLC  CADF  LLC  CADF 
logY  3.753  -2.335  -13.053***  -3.891*** 
EG  1.629  -2.305  -7.737***  -2.721*** 
PS  1.326  -2.254  -12.161***  -4.158*** 
PR  1.326  -2.114  -13.791***  -3.534*** 
PC  3.483  -2.267  -15.621***  -3.878*** 
EG*PS  2.300  -1.583  -13.258***  -2.842*** 
EG*PR  2.928  -2.239  -12.936***  -3.565*** 
EG*PC  2.802  -2.339  -12.057***  -3.737*** 
logY*  2.909  -2.166  -12.689***  -3.893*** 
logL  0.788  -2.284  -9.824***  -3.991*** 
K  -0.616  -2.019  -11.828***  -2.998*** 
Note: We include a linear time trend in the deterministic component in all tests 
since the series are trended. Issues related to the choice of optimal lag length are 
settled with the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). The critical values for LLC 
and CADF are based on Levin and Lin (1992) and Pesaran (2007) respectively. 
*** denote rejection of the null hypothesis of unit root at the 1% error level.  
 
Pedroni’s panel cointegration test procedure   
 
The procedure involved in computing the seven test statistics first estimate and 
stores the residuals from equation (1). The second step uses kernel estimator to 
                                                        
22 The LLC and CADF statistics have been implemented using the routine “XTUNITROOT” and 
“PESCADF” in STATA respectively. Not reported, we also performed the Fisher-type panel unit 
root test due to Choi (2001) using the routine “XTUNITROOT” in STATA that provides additional 
support to our results    30
compute the long run variance  (L
Ù2
11i) from the residuals ( it h
Ù
) of the differenced 
regression of the form  1 1 .... it i it Mi Mit it y x x s s h D = D + + D + .  This long run variance is 
required to compute the panel statistics. In the third step, we use the estimated 
residuals  ( it e
Ù
)  from  equation  (1)  to  compute  the  appropriate  autoregressive 
models.  For  the  non-parametric  statistics  we  estimate  , 1 it i t i it e r e j
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). In this expression K denotes the truncation lag permitted to 
vary by individual countries. The term 
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seven panel statistics expressed in equations (9) to (15) are then computed with 
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Panel r-statistic: 
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Panel t-statistic (non-parametric): 
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Panel t-statistic (parametric): 
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All statistics test the null hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative 
hypothesis of cointegration. The distinction rests on the treatment of  ri  in the 
formulation of the alternative hypothesis. The panel cointegration statistics test 
the null hypothesis that  ri =1 for all  i, versus the alternative hypothesis that   32
ri = r <1 for all  i. While the group mean panel cointegration statistics test the 
null hypothesis that  ri =1 for all i, versus the alternative hypothesis that  ri <1 
for all  i. Thus, whilst under the alternative hypothesis the former assumes a 
common value for ri  (i.e. ri = r ), the later does not. 
 
The estimated results of Pedroni’s seven panel cointegration test statistics are 
reported in Table 3.2A – 3.3A23. 
 
Table 3.2A Panel cointegration test results (equation 2) 
 
Models  I  II  III 
Pedroni’s panel cointegration statistics 
Panel v-statistic  -0.977  -0.881  -0.919 
Panel r-statistic  -1.261  -1.505  -1.783* 
Panel pp-statistic  -9.487***  -10.162***  -10.913*** 
Panel adf-statistic  -9.674***  -11.165***  -11.124*** 
Pedroni’s group mean panel cointegration statistics 
Group r-statistic  3.011***  2.499**  2.122** 
Group pp-statistic  -2.689***  -3.998***  -4.416*** 
Group adf-statistic  -3.747***  -5.404***  -4.935*** 
Note: All test statistics are asymptotically normally distributed. However, for the 
panel v-statistic only the right tail of the normal distribution is used to reject the 
null hypothesis as it diverges to positive infinity under the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration.  ***(**)(*)  denote  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  of  no 






                                                        
23 The tests include deterministic time trend and common time dummies and are implemented 
using  Pedroni’s  procedure  available  in  RATS.    Not  reported,  we  also  considered  the  panel 
cointegration test due to Kao (1999) that assumes slope homogeneity across the cross-sectional 
units of the panel. Kao’s test results provides additional support to Pedroni’s test results.    33
Table 3.3A Panel cointegration test results (equation 2A) 
 
Models  I  II  III 
Pedroni’s panel cointegration statistics 
Panel v-statistic  -1.801  -1.631  -1.744 
Panel r-statistic  1.934*  1.595  1.953* 
Panel pp-statistic  -7.646***  -9.529***  -8.356*** 
Panel adf-statistic  -7.444***  -8.872***  -7.984*** 
Pedroni’s group mean panel cointegration statistics 
Group r-statistic  4.601***  4.641***  4.617*** 
Group pp-statistic  -4.154***  -4.093***  -4.010*** 
Group adf-statistic  -3.480***  -3.124***  -4.224*** 
Note: All test statistics are asymptotically normally distributed. However, for the 
panel v-statistic only the right tail of the normal distribution is used to reject the 
null hypothesis as it diverges to positive infinity under the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration. ***(*) denote rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 





Panel group mean FMOLS estimator 
 
The  panel  group  mean  FMOLS  estimate  equation  (1)  and  xit = xi,t-1 + eit .  The 
innovation  vector 
' ( , ) it it it e w e =   is  (0) I   with  asymptotic  long  run  covariance 









  and  autocovariances  Gi , and  ( , ) it it it z y x =   is    (1) I  
and  yit  and  xit are cointegrated.  The panel group mean FMOLS estimator for  b  
gives: 
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Table 4.1A Panel FMOLS estimates (equation 2A) 
 
Variables  I  II  III 
logL  0.605***(8.206)  0.616***(8.051)  0.560***(8.164) 
K  0.004***(9.305)  0.004***(7.971)  0.003***(7.496) 
EG  -0.0005(-0.665)  -0.0003(-0.384)  -0.0016*(-1.883) 
PS  -0.131**(-2.556)     
PR    -0.213***(-3.649)   
PC      -0.242***(-3.96) 
EG*PS  0.0031**(2.108)     
EG*PR    0.0072***(4.447)   
EG*PC      0.0095***(5.356) 
Note:  Dependent  variable  logY*.  In  parenthesis  are  t-ratios.  ***(**)[*]  denote 
rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1%(5%)[10%] error level. 
 